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FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS
AMERICANS should not be greatly surprised that Russian
exiles, returning from the United States to receive a Maximalist
welcome in their native country, should have reported that Ameri-
can liberty was a fraud and delusion, or that the Maximalists in
Petrograd should so fiercely resent the conviction of Alexander
Berkman and Emma Goldman for resistance to the Draft Act*
that they have given public notice of their intention to hold the
American Ambassador as a sort of hostage for these tw6 Bol-
sheviki, so sadly out of place. The Russian who drank in with
his mother's milk the doctrine that liberty necessarily involves
opposition to the existing government, and that freedom is exemp-
tion from police interference, finding in America that he can no
more do what is contrary to the law than he could in Russia un-
der the Czar, naturally reaches the conclusion that the term
"the land of the free" is a hollow mockery. Especially is he
shocked when he discovers that in spite of the oft heard state-
ment made by the champions of English liberty, and echoed by
the courts, that freedom of speech and freedom of the press are
the cornerstones of Anglo-Saxon democracy,: and in spite of
the clear and vigorous language of the first amendment to the
constitution of the United States that "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,"
*See Goldman v. United States, (1918) U. S. Adv. Opt. 1917, p. 215.
1 See, for example, State v. Pierce, (1916) 163 Wis. 615, 158 N. W. 696.
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he is promptly arrested and imprisoned if he counsels, orally or
in writing, resistance to the laws of the land. This confusion
of mind is by no means lessened when he sees ignorant members
of the I. W. W. hauled, fairly in droves, to prison on charges of
sedition and encouraging resistance to the law, while at the same
time prominent members of Congress and distinguished citizens
outside of Congress, with impunity, make heavy charges of in-
competence and even of dishonesty against the government and
its officers. In the confusion of a swift moving scene in a strange
land it is not surprising that the Russian attorney for the unfor-
tunate Russians who had talked not wisely but too much, should,
with total unconsciousness of the exquisite humor concealed in
the remark, have complained bitterly to the law officers of the
federal government that Berkman and Miss Goldman had been
denied the immemorial privileges of Englishmen. Undoubtedly
it is difficult to determine how to draw the line just at the place
where criticism of the government and its measures becomes op-
position to the government and resistance to the laws. The pur-
pose of this paper will be to attempt to set forth as clearly as
possible just where and how this line is drawn.
In addition to the provision of the federal constitution above
,quoted,2 each of the states has incorporated in its constitution a
provision of similar import. For example, Article 3 of the Bill
of Rights in the constitution of Minnesota provides that:
"The liberty of the press shall forever remain inviolate, and
all persons may freely write, speak and publish their sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right. '"3
2 The first amendment of the federal constitution in full reads as
-follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
Teligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the fight of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." This amend-
ment is expressly a limitation upon .the power of Congress, and not upon
the states. Justice Harlan dissenting in Patterson v. Colorado, (1907)
205 U.S. 454 (464), 51 L. Ed. 879, 27 S. C. R. 556, 10 Ann. Cas. 689, was
of the opinion that the right of free discussion given by the first amend-
ment was one of the attributes of federal citizenship protected against
state action by that clause of the fourteenth amendment forbidding any
state to "make or. enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States;' and also by the clause of
the same amendment forbidding the states to deprive any person of his
liberty without due process of law. Miller, J., was of different opinion in
Butchers' Association v. Crescent City Live Stock Co., (1872) 16 Wall.
(U.S.) 36 (74), 21 L. Ed. 394; as -was Chief Justice Waite in United
States v. Cruikshank. (1875) 92 U. S. 542. 23 L. Ed. 588. See also In re
Quarles, (1894) 158 U. S. 532 (535), 39 L. Ed. 1080, 15 S. C. R. 959.
3 The constitution of Massachusetts, Part 1, Article 16, limits the guar-
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In the first place it is to be noted that while the provision of
the federal constitution does not contain the statement that per-
sons are responsible for the abuse of the right given, as do most
of the state constitutions, yet such a limitation upon the apparently
unqualified language of the federal constitution is necessarily
implied. That even the most jealously guarded guaranties of the
federal constitution, as for instance that of "life, liberty and
property," are qualified by other provisions of that instrument
and by the requirements of the police power of the several states,
is so well known and well settled that it may be stated without ar-
gument or citation of authority. If illustration were needed it
could be strikingly found in the recent decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States holding constitutional the selective
draft act, depriving certain citizens of their liberty, often much
against their will.4 If personal liberty can be sacrificed in the
interest of public defense, it would be indeed a strange thing if
the liberty of the press and of speech were to be so absolute as
to permit its exercise in aid of the enemy, or otherwise in antag-
onism to the public welfare. But the difficult question to be set-
tled is how far may the government go in restricting the free-
dom of discussion in order to protect the public welfare?
Before attempting to arrive at the answer to this question
there are two perfectly simple propositions which must be stated
and $et aside in order to avoid confusion of thought. The first
of these is that these constitutional guaranties protect the citizen
only from suffering legal consequences at the hands of the gov-
ernment authorities acting in the alleged enforcement of law.
They do not, and cannot, protect the citizen against the social
consequences of exercising his legal privilege to say what he
pleases. Every citizen of the United States has the right, gen-
erally speaking, to bray like an ass if he wishes; but he need not
-expect the constitution of the United States to protect him against
the unpleasant social consequences of being regarded as an ass.
The preacher in the pulpit is undoubtedly within his legal rights
if he should say that Satan, in the midst of his most diabolical
activities, was a Christian gentleman if he chanced to wear a Ger-
man helmet; but he should not expect the constitution to keep him
anty to liberty of the press. See Commonwealth v. McC-ann, (1913) 213
Mass. 213, 100 N. E. 355.
4 Arver v. United States, (1918) 38 S. C. R. 159, U. S. Adv. Ops. 1917,
page 193. See also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, (1905) ,197 U. S. 11, 49 L.
Ed. 643, 25 S. C. R. 358, 3 Ann. Cas. 765.
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long in an American pulpit thereafter. The college professor who
should say to his class that the moon was made of green cheese,
or that the Lusitania was sunk strictly in accordance with inter-
national law, or that all forms of government were essentially bad
and should be abolished, might well be within his constitutional
rights, but ought not to expect long to be within his classroom.
So it was a foolish member of a social club who, having been
expelled for publishing certain uncomplimentary comments about
his fellow members, asked a court to compel his reinstatement on
the ground that the constitution permitted him freely to "speak,
write and publish" his sentiments on all subjects.5 The consti-
tution will protect a man against legal punishment for merely
foolish talk, but it cannot protect him from the social conse-
quences.
The second elementary proposition is that this provision of the
federal constitution, and of the state constitutions as well, does
not create the right of freedom of speech and of the press, but
merely protects an existing right from abridgment or interfer-
ence.6 In view of this fact our problem is, then, reduced to a
determination of the scope and extent of the existing right of free
publication and free speech at the time of the adoption of the fed-
eral constitution. It may be well also, before attempting such de-
termination, to call attention to the fact that this constitutional
guaranty is available only to citizens of the United States and
does not extend to aliens ;7 and further that it has no necessary
application to the rules and regulations of the Post Office de-
partment as to exclusion from the mails.' A refusal by the gov-
ernment to carry in its mails a book or periodical does not pro-
hibit its publication. Neither does a statute prohibiting political
activity on the part of employees and officers of the government
deprive them of their right freely to speak and write their opin-
ions.' By withdrawing from the government service, as they
'freely may, they escape the restraint laid upon their political ac-
tivity; and the government has the right to make reasonable rules
5 Barry v. Players, (1911) 130 N:Y. Supp. 701.
6 Cooley, Constitutional Law 299.
7Goldman v. Reyburn, 36 Pa. Co. 581; United States v. Williams,(1904) 194 U. S. 279, 48 L. Ed. 979, 24 S. C. R. 719.
8 Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, (1913) 229 U. S. 288, 57 L. Ed. 1190,
33 S. C. R. 867. See especially Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, (C. C. A.
1917) 246 Fed. 24, 45 Wash. L. Rep. 706, reviewing the cases.
9 Duffy v. Cooke, (1913) 239 Pa. St. 427, 86 Atl. 1076, Ann. Cas. 1915A
550.
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and regulations governing the conduct of its employees so long
as the good of the service is the bona fide purpose of such regu-
lation.
What, then, was the scope and extent of the right of free dis-
cussion at common law at the time that the federal constitution
was adopted? A distinguished writer on constitutional law gives
the following answer :10
"We understand liberty of speech and of the press to imply
not only liberty to publish, but' complete immunity from legal
censure and punishment for the publication, so long as it is not
harmful in its character, when tested by such standards as the law
affords. For these standards we must look to the common-law
rules which were in force when the constitutional guaranties were
established, and in reference to which they have been adopted."
Vann, J., in the famous case resulting in the conviction of
Johann Most of a seditious publication, gives expression to the
same principle in the following vigorous language:1"
"It [the constitution] places no restraint upon the power of
the legislature to punish the publication of matter which is in-
jurious to society according to the standard of the common law.
It does not deprive the state of the primary right of self preser-
vation."
There is a very general impression, even among lawyers, that
the right of free discussion, whether oral or in writing, is one of
the fundamental rights of Englishmen; that it is somehow a part
of the English constitution. But such is not the case.12 It is
true that English judges have not infrequently spoken of the free-
dom of speech as a recognized, though restricted, right, and fam-
ous statesmen and publicists have, from time to time during the
long struggle for English liberty, eulogized the right of free dis-
cussion of public events as the palladium of the constitution, and
the greatest engine of public safety. Sir James Mackintosh, in
the case of Peltier,' 3 indicted for seditious libel, said:
"There is one country [England] where man can freely exer-
cise his reason on the most important concerns of society, where
he can boldly publish his judgment on the acts of the proudest
and most powerful tyrants."
Milton's famous essay, "Areopagitica," is an eloquent argu-
ment for the right of free discussion of public events, although
I0 Cooley, Constitutional Lim. 518.
"I People v. Most, (1902) 171 N. Y. 423, 64 N. E. 175, 58 L. R. A. 509.
12 See Dicey, Law of the Constitution, fourth ed., 236.
13 Rex v. Peltier, (1803) 28 St. Tr. 529.
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he is very careful to make it clear that the principles that he con-
tends for so vigorously, have no application to Papists. In the
same manner Erskine would pause in the midst of his glowing
periods in eulogy of the right of free speech to express his entire
approval of the denial of that right to religious heretics. 14 In
view of such statements on the bench, at the bar and in Parlia-
ment, it is rather surprising that we find no mention of such right
in the Petition of Right (1628), or the Bill of Rights (1689), the
two great constitutional documents that are the direct forerunners
of our own Bill of Rights. In fact until comparatively recent
times, the right of public discussion so far from being free, was
very narrowly restricted. When Henry VII introduced the
printing press into England it seems to have been taken for
granted that the press could be used only by license of the King.,5
The granting of such license, which was continued through suc-
ceeding reigns, was probably at first intended more as a means
of securing a monopoly to the licensee than as a device of censor-
ship, but in the time of Elizabeth the practice of sing the
license as a means of controlling the character of publications had
become well established. During the reign of James I the Star
Chamber had taken over the regulation of the press, and, true to
its evil genius, had soon developed it into a very effective engine
of oppression. Unlicensed publishers were punished by whipping,
the pillory and imprisonment.1 6 With the fall of the Star Cham-
ber in 1641 Parliament took over the press censorship, but the
restraints imposed upon all publications were scarcely less op-
pressive. After the Revolution of 1688 these regulations grad-
ually fell into disuse, and after the expiration of the last licens-
ing act in 1694 it was never renewed. 17
But even after the Englishman had become thus free to print,
just as he might speak, what he would without previous license,
he remained fully liable either in civil action or in criminal prose-
cution for any wrong committed in the exercise of his freedom.
To use the blunt language of Lord Kenyon :'8
"It [the liberty of the press] is neither more nor less than
this, that a man may publish anything which twelve of his coun-
trymen think is not blamable, but that he ought to be punished
if he publishes that which is blamable."
14 See 70 Cent. Law J. 189.
1-5 Paterson, Liberty of Press and Speech 44.
16 Ibid 77.
17 Ibid 46.
18 Rex v. Cuthell, (1799) 27 St Tr. 641 (675).
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To the same effect is Dicey's statement19 that:
" reedom of discussion is, then, in England little else than the
right to write or say. anything which a jury, consisting of twelve
shopkeepers, think it expedient should be said or written."
According to common law standards a man is not free to
make false statements injuring the reputation of another though
made with good intention. There were, however, certain rela-
tions in which communication of information was so essential
to the public welfare that there arose exceptions to this rule. In
some instances public policy so clearly demanded immunity for
utterances that the law would not allow them to be drawn into
question at all, as for instance, statements made in Parliament
or by a judge on the bench. Such statements were said to be
absolutely privileged. In other relations where the public inter-
est was less deeply involved, communications were made-subject
only to a qualified privilege, being actionable only if proved to be
malicious as well as false. It was about this doctrine of qualified
privilege for discussion of men and measures as applied to charges
of seditious libel that the fiercest battles were fought; and it was
in these notorious state trials that we find most of the famous
statements made about the freedom of speech and of the press,
which, it should be noted, were made by barristers and judges in
their efforts to define the common law crime of seditious libel.
Closely akin to the crime of seditious libel was that of
blasphemy, which consisted in denying any of the tenets of the
established religion, or criticising the practices or prelates of the
established church. The common law attitude toward religious
discussion is well represented by the statement of Hale, J.,20
"To say that religion is a cheat is to dissolve all those obligations
whereby civil societies are preserved." In the time of Elizabeth
any criticism whatever of the church was deemed ipso facto an
attempt to subvert the government. In the time of the Stuarts
the subservient judges pushed this doctrine of blasphemy and
sedition so far, in response to orders from their royal masters,
that an unfortunate author of a book attacking the stage, which
was then under the patronage of the Merry Monarch's queen,
was indicted for saying that "dancing was the devil's profession,
and fiddlers were the minstrels of the devil." The presiding
judge decided that this was a seditious libel of so wicked a
29 Dicey, Law of the Constitution (fourth ed.) 234.
20 Reg. v. Taylor, (1687) 1 Ventris 293.
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character that it made his blood boil. The unhappy defendant
had his ears. cut off, was put in the pillory, fined five thousand
pounds and imprisoned for life.2 1 The prosecutions for sedition
and blasphemy in the time of the Stuarts, and the barbarous fer-
ocity of the punishments inflicted, 22 form one of the darkest pages
in the history of English law, which one cannot read without the
conviction that the bloody Jeffreys justly bears the infamy that at-
taches to his name.
Another restriction at 'common law upon freedom of discus-
sion nearly related to the crime of blasphemy was that of making
an immoral or obscene publication. This crime, originating in
the Ecclesiastical courts, and growing to vigor under the sym-
pathetic ministrations of the Star Chamber, came subsequently to
be recognized in Westminster Hall as a common law crime. As
late as 1765 Wilkes was indicted and convicted for the publica-
tion of his "Essay on Woman," which was deemed so indecent
as to be an offense at common law.
2
3
At common law no, person without license might publish any
account of Parliamentary debates. Any person doing so might
be punished as guilty of a breach of the privilege of the House.
In the eighteenth century, however, newspaper reports became
more and more frequent until finally no further attempt was made
to prevent their publication, although the Parliamentary order
prohibiting such publication has never been rescinded.2 4
The common law did not permit anyone to write or speak any-
thing that would corrupt or interfere with the administration of
justice. Therefore any publication imputing misconduct to a
judge was an indictable offense. The right of every court to
protect itself in the discharge of its functions by contempt pro-
ceedings has been long recognized, this power on the part of the
courts being coeval with the common law.25
" It is now necessary to consider briefly the status of the so-
called freedom of the press and of speech in the colonies prior
21 Rex v. Prynne, (1632) 3 St. Tr. 561.
22 As late as 1656 a certain Quaker, obviously insane, was convicted of
blasphemous personation of the Saviour and punished by having his tongue
bored with a red hot iron, by having a letter "R" branded upon his fore-
head, and was whipped, and pilloried. See Paterson, Liberty of Press and
Speech 68.
23 Rex v. Wilkes, (1770) 4 Burr. 2527 (2530), 2 Wils. 151, 4 Bro. P. C.
360.
24See Kilbourn v. Thompson, (1880) 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. Ed. 377;
Paterson, Liberty of Press and Speech Chap. 6.
25 See the extended opinion in State v. Shepherd, (1903) 177 Mo. 205,
76 S. W. 79, 99 Am. St. Rep. 624.
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to the revolution, as throwing light upon the question of what
was the right which the first amendment of the constitution of
the United States declared should not be abridged.
When the colonists first came to this country in the early
part of the seventeenth century they brought with them the then
prevailing English views as to restrictions upon the freedom of
public discussion, which were in no wise lessened in the severe
minds of the Puritans of New England or in the royalist policies
of the Cavaliers of Virginia. That stout royalist, Governor
Berkeley of Virginia, had no intention of permitting the common
people to concern themselves with the affairs of government. We
find him, in 1671, thanking God "there are no free schools or
printing; and I hope we shall not have these hundred years; for
learning has brought disobedience, and heresy, and sects into
the world, and printing has divulged them, and libels against the
best government. God keep us from both.' '28 The prohibition of
all printing except by license was in full force in Virginia, Mas-
sachusetts and New York, and probably in other colonies as
well. In 1662 a statute was passed in Massachusetts appoint-
ing two licensors of the ptess and prohibiting the publication of
anything whatever not previously approved by these licensors.
The laws of Massachusetts were first published in 1649, and those
of Virginia in 1682. The unlicensed publisher of the Virginia
laws was arrested and held under bond until the pleasure of the
King could be made known. The King promptly forbade the
further publication of such laws.2 7 In fact the requirement of a
previous license for publication persisted in Massachusetts more
than a score of years longer than in England, having been abol-
ished only in 1719.28
The famous Bill of Rights, prepared by George Mason in
1776, for the Virginia constitution, appears to have been the first
constitutional document recognizing the existence of the right of
free speech and free press. Others of the new states gave recog-
nition in their constitutions to this right, but when in 1787 the
federal constitutional convention met, the proposal, made at dif-
ferent times by Mr. Pinckney, that the new constitution should
include a guaranty of liberty of the press, received little atten-
tion, -and was not included in the constitution as finally submitted
26 See 2 Watson, Constitution 1400.
27 1 Hildreth, History of the United States 561.
28 4 Harv. Law Rev. 379.
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to the states for ratification. 29  The first amendment, in the form
in which it was adopted, as is well known, was drawn up by the
first Congress at the behest of the legislatures of the several
states. Indeed it is worth noting that when the constitutional
convention met, it was still strongly affected with the English
idea that it was contrary to public welfare that the debates and
proceedings should be communicated to the public; hence the
convention sat behind closed doors and all its members were en-
joined to hold the proceedings secret. Even after the establish-
ment of the new government, the Senate, for several years, re-
fused to open its doors to the public, or allow publication,of its
debates.30
In the light of this brief survey of the development of the so-
called common law right of free speech and of free press, what
was in the minds of those in Congress who drafted the first
amendment, and of the legislatures of the states when they rati-
fied it in these terms: "Congress shall make no law ....
abridging the freedom- of speech or of the press ?" Was lthe right
of a free press thus guaranteed merely exemption from the re-
quirement of license previous to publication with such liability
for the publication as existed by common law rule or might be
imposed by statute; or was it intended by this provision to protect
a right not only to publication without license, but also to immu-
nity from prosecutions of the vexatious and oppressive sort that
had so outraged the lovers of freedom both in England and in
the colonies during the preceding century?
There can be no question but that the prevailing view of the
American courts is in accordance with the former construction.
Blackstone,3 1 writing some twenty years before the adoption of
the constitution, -said that freedom of the press "consists in lay-
ing no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom
from censure for criminal matter when published. . . . To
subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser, as was
formerly done, both before and since the revolution, is to sub-
ject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and
make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted
points in learning, religion and government." Delolme,32 writing
29 2 Watson, Constitution' 1401.
30 Cooley, Constitutional Lim. 515.
314 Black. Commentaries 151. In Rex v. St. Asaph, 3 T. R. 428, note
a (431), Lord Mansfield said: "The liberty pf the press consists in printing
without any previous license, subject to the consequence of law."
32 Delolme, Constitutional History of England 287.
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at nearly the same time as the sitting of the federal constitutional
convention, took exactly the same view of the common law right.
In a recent case33 the Supreme Court of the United States de-
clared that: "The main purpose of such constitutional provisions
is to prevent all such previous restraints as had been practiced by
other governments, and they do not pfevent the subsequent pun-
ishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare."
The court then proceeds to the length of saying, unnecessarily,
"The preliminary freedom extends as well to the false as to the
true; the subsequent punishment may extend as well to the true
as to the false."
The state courts have adopted substantially the same point of
view in construing both the special provisions of the state consti-
tutions and the first amendment of the federal constitution. It
should be noted, however, that while it appears to be generally as-
sumed that the usual working of 'the provision as found in the
state constitutions, which guarantees to every citizen the right
freely to speak, write or publish his sentiments, with responsibil-
ity for the abuse of such freedom, merely states expressly what
is implied in the briefer form of the federal constitution. Yet
there are some cases that find a marked difference in meaning.
Thus in a recent Louisiana case, 34 a court enjoined the threat-
ened publication of a false list of petitioners because such publica-
tion would not be of defendant's "sentiments," which the consti-
tution gave him an inviolable right to publish, but rather of a mere
list of names. The distinction impresses one as being painfully
mechanical.
There is not wanting, however; authority"5 for the contention
that the intention of those adopting the first amendment was to
protect the public not merely against the requirement of previous
license, but also against unreasonable and oppressive prosecutions
in consequence of publication of statements displeasing to those
having control of the machinery of government. There can
3 Patterson v. Colorado, (1907) 205 U. S. 454 (462), 51" L. Ed. 879,
27 S. C. R. 556, 10 Ann. Cas. 689.
• 4Schwartz v. Edrington, (1913) 133 La. 235. 62 So. 660, Ann. Cas.
1915B 1180. In Empire Theatre Co. v. Cloke, (1917) 53 Mont. 183, 163
Pac. 107, L.R. A. 1917E 383 (386), .the court said:
'We still think that this second clause of our provision conveys the
idea of liberty, unchecked as to what may be published by anything save
penalty, and is therefore so material a departure from the meaning given
the national provision that the Federal cases have little, if any, significance."
35 Cooley, Constitutional Lira. 517. See also cases cited in notes 63-66,
infra.
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be no doubt that the prosecutions in England, as well as in the
colonies, for seditious libel were often highly oppressive to a
degree that would not be tolerated in England today, and it seems
not unreasonable to infer that the constitution makers had that
well known fact in mind, and intended to secure for the citizens
of the new Union, not only freedom from press censorship, but
also the right freely to discuss public affairs, whether in oral
speech or in print, with the same degree of immunity that then
existed in. England as the result of two centuries of struggle
against the claim of the King's divine right to govern. The the-
ory adopted by the courts, that the freedom of the press guaran-
teed is merely freedom from previous license to print, also illogic-
ally ignores the freedom of speech, partner in this guaranty with
the liberty of the press. The freedom of speech guaranteed can-
not have any relation to previous license, wholly unknown in
practice. Surely freedom of speech was intended to mean that a
citizen's right to express publicly his opinions concerning public
men and public events was to be unrestricted save as he might
render himself liable to civil action for slander or criminal prose-
cution for treason or sedition in accordance with then exist-
ing common law rules. It seems strange that in the great mass
of the litigation involving the construction of such constitutional
guaranties none of the courts seem to have considered the infer-
ence here suggested from the association of free speech with the
free press, or, indeed, to have given the question of the proper
construction of the guaranty that degree of careful consideration
which its importance and historical interest deserve and invite.
This result no doubt is due, in part, to the fact that the cases in-
volving publication of printed matter are so very much more
numerous than those concerning public speech that the judicial
mind is apt to confine its attention to the liberty of the press.
From many of the decisions it appears that the requirements
of the constitutional guaranty are satisfied if the act of publica-
tion is left uncensored and the legislature is free to attach such
consequences to the publication as it may see fit. Thus according
to this view, it may make criminal a publication that would have
been perfectly innocent at common law. One might not at com-
mon law be guilty of libeling a man long since dead, yet in a re-
cent case"8 in the state of Washirgton a man was severely pun-
ished for publishing an article tending to bring George Washing-
36 State v. Haffer, (1916) 94 Wash. 136, 162 Pac. 45, L. R. A. 1917C 610.
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ton into public contempt although the court- took judicial notice
of the fact that the first president was long since dead, with no
descendants in the state, and this on the scant ground that though
the statute created a liability not known to the common law, yet
it was perfectly valid since it did not require any previous license.
In the same state a statute making it a misdemeanor to encourage
disrespect for the law, not a crime at common law these two ln-
dred years past, w@s held for the same, short reason not to de-
prive the defendant of his right to publish his sentiments freely.37
It would seem that such decisions are as much out of harm ony
with the spirit of the common law rule crystallized in the consti-
tutional form as the statutes in question are unwisely meddle-
some.
Those statutes which merely render more definite an existing
common law rule, or cure a defect in its application, are not ob-
noxious to the principle just discussed. Examples of such statutes
are those making a false charge of unchastity against a woman
slanderous per se,38 or declaring slander a misdemeanor, 9 as libel
always has been. Of course those statutes making seditious ut-
terances .punishable as crimes, such as the Federal Espionage
Act,40 or the Minnesota Loyalty Act,4" are unassailable, although
one could wish the courts had upheld them on the ground that
such utterances were crimes at common law and therefore never
within the meaning of the freedom guaranteed by the constitution,
and not solely on the thin ground that no preliminary license re-
quirement was imposed. These are but instances under the gen-
eral rule, universally accepted, that this constitutional provision
affords no protection for acts which at common law were crimes.
Neither is it necessary to resort to the mere no license theory
to support that large class of cases holding that statutes .pro-
hibiting utterances, publications or exhibitions tending to incite
breaches of the peace, cause riots and disorder, to corrupt public
morals, endanger public safety, or otherwise affeot injuriously the
public welfare, do not invade the constitutional right of freedom
37 State v. Fox, (1912) 71 Wash."185, 127 Pac. 1111.
38 See Newell, Libel and Slander, 3rd ed., 178.
31 Hyde v. State, (1915) 159 Wis. 651, 150 N. W. 965. So the sale of
obscene newspapers may be forbidden. State v. McKee, (1900) 73 Conn.
18, 46 AtI. 409, 84 Am. St. Rep. 124, 49 L. R. A. 542.
40 Act June 15, 1917, Chap. 30, Title I, Sec. 3, sustained in United States
v. Pierce, (1917) 245 Fed. 878.
"1 Laws of 1917, Chap. 463, sustained in State v. Holm, (Minn. 1918)
166 R. W. 181.
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of speech or of the press. Examples of such statutes declared to
be valid are those penalizing utterances or publications tending to
encourage the commission of crimes, 42 to prevent or hinder en-
listment in the military forces of the United States or of the
state,43 the use of profane language under such circumstances as
may distuib the public peace,4 ' the publication of false and fraud-
ulent advertisements, 5 or of grossly false reports of judicial pro-
ceedings,46 or forbidding the publishing or sale of newspapers de-
voted to reports and stories of crime and scandal,4 7 or the sending
of written or printed communications threatening to accuse the
recipient of a criminal action or to attack his reputation or
credit.48 'In most instances the publications thus prohibited are
crimes, so that the prohibiting statutes are valid under the general
rule, but even though they be not crimes at common law, as in
the case of fraudulent advertisements, they are removed from the
protection of the constitutional guaranty because of the para-
-mount implications incident -to all proper exercise of the police
power. This principle is strikingly illustrated in a statute passed
by the Legislature of Minnesota prohibiting any newspaper from
publishing any of the details of a legal execution "beyond a state-
ment of the fact that such a convict was on the day in question
duly executed according to law." A newspaper, prosecuted for
the violation of this statute, set up in defense its constitutional
privilege under the provision of the state constitution that "the
liberty of the-press shall forever remain inviolate." In sustain-
ing the statute, the court said :41
"Appellant argues that there are no constitutional limitations
upon the liberty of the press, unless the subject matter be blasphe-
mous, obscene, seditious, or scandalous in its character. This
is altogether too restricted a view. The principle is the same,
whether the subj~ct matter of the publication is distinctly
blasphemous, seditious, or scandalous, or of such character as
42 People v. Most, (1902) 171 N. Y. 423, 64 N. E. 175, 58 L. R. A. 50 9.
4BUnited States v. Pierce, (1917) 245 Fed. 878;" State v. Holm, (Minn.
1918) 166 N. W. 181.
44 State v. Warren, (1893) 113 N. C. 683, 18 S. E. 498.
45 People v. Apfelbaum, (1911) 251 II. 18, 95 N. E. 995; State v. Blair,(1894) 92 Iowa 28, 60 N. W. 496.
46 State ex rel. Haskell v. Foulds, (1895) 17 Mont. 140, 42 Pac. 285.
47State v. MtcKee; (1900) 73 Conn. 18, 46 Atl. 409, 84 Am. St. Rep. 124,
49 L. R. A. 542; State v. Van Wyl, (1896) 136 Mo. 227, 37 S. W. 938, 58
Am. St. Rep. 627.
4s State v. McCabe, (1896) 135 Mo. 450, 37 S. W. 123, 58 Am. St. Rep.
589, 34 L. R. A. 127.
49 State v. Pioneer Press Co., (1907) 100 Minn. 193, 110 N. W. 869,
117 Am. St. Rep. 684, 9 L. R.A. (N. S.) 480, 10 Ann. Cas. 351.
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naturally tends to excite the public mind and thus indirectly affect
the public good."
The universally recognized rule that the liberty of the press
guaranteed by the constitution does not affect the power of the
courts to punish for contempts, a power inherent in the courts and
coeval with the common law,50 or afford any immunity for libel
or slander,51 may also be amply supported as an existing common
law principle embodied by implication in the constitutional pro-
vision and qualifying the right thereby guaranteed.
It is necessary to admit, however, that the courts sustain these
statutes and enforce these liabilities for the most part either on
the ground that since no previous license is required, the liberty
of publication is not violated, or on the general theory that it
would be "a libel on the Bill of Rights which guarantees free
speech to assert that it was intended to protect any one in such
despicable practices.
'5 2
Certain rather surprising results have followed the application
of the rule that the guaranty of free publication absolutely forbids
any previous restraint upon publication. It has been held broadly
on this ground that no court may enjoin an intended publication
of any kind, however serious or irreparable may be the threat-
ened damage. "The purpose of this provision of the constitution
was the abolishment of censorship, and for courts to act as cen-
sors is directly a 'violation of that purpose." This statement was
made as the reason why the California supreme court annulled
an order of the superior court enjoining the advertisement and
production of a play, which, the complainant alleged, set forth .in
an unfair and prejudicial manner the facts relating to an alleged
murder for which complainant was then on trial for his life.53
The court admitted that such theatrical representation would in-
terfere with the administration of justice, and prevent a fair trial,
but it thought this wrong-doer absolutely protected by the consti-
tution. It may be added that the English courts have never hesi-
tated to enjoin a publication- tending to interfere with any kind of
judicial proceedings.54 The decision seems the more unfortunate
50 State v. Shepherd, (1903) 177 Mo. 205, 76 S. W. 79, 99 Am. St. Rep.
624; In re Hayes, (1916) 72 Fla. 558, 73 So, 762, L. R. A. 1917D 192.
51 Cooley, Constitutional Law 302.
52 State v. McCabe, (1896) 135 Mo. 450, 37 S. W. 123, 58 Am. St. Rep.
589, 34 L. R. A. 127; United States v. Pierce, (1917) 245 Fed. 878.
53 Dailey v. Superior Court, (1896) 112 Cal. 94, 44 Pac. 438, 53 Am. St
Rep. 160, 32 L. R. A. 273.
54 See Matthews v. Smith, (1844) 3 Hare 331 ; Kitcat v. Sharp, (1882)
52 L. J. Ch. 134, 48 L. T. 64; Odgers, Libel and Slander, 5th ed., 539.
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in view of the common practice of requiring licenses of all thea-
tres, and the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States that moving picture productions are not within the pur-
view of this provision, and therefore fully subject to censorship,55
Some of the courts have based their refusal to enjoin a libel on the
ground that the constitution prohibits interference with a libelous
publication.58 As such action finds ample support in the settled
rule of equity that no injunction will issue when the ldw provides
an adequate remedy for the threatened injury, it is to be regretted
that the constitutional provision was needlessly lugged in.
57
For a like reason the Nebraska supreme court refused to en-
join publication of a false stafement that the complainant would
not be a candidate for a public office which he sought. The court
was of opinion that "The exercise of censorship by a court of
equity through the writ of injunction is no less objectionable than
the exercise of that function by other departments of the govern-
ment."5 8
The same rigid theory that no previous restraint can be put
upon a publication of any kind has been held to render a court
powerless to enjoin a boycott, which necessarily involves as its
most important feature publication of the strikers' complaints, de-
mands and threats.59 The Montana supreme court, in refusing to
enjoin a boycott, stated that it was "unable to conceive how any-
one can possess the right to publish what he pleases, subject only
to penalty for abuse, and at the same time be prevented by any
court from doing so.
''6
0
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, has es-
caped this dilemma by holding, in the celebrated Gompers' contempt
55 Mutual Film Corp. -v. Ohio Industrial Comujission, (1915) 236 U. S.
230, 35 S. C. R. 387, 59 L. Ed. 552, Ann. Cas. 1916C 296. See also Common-
wealth v. McGann, (1913) 213 Mass. 213, 100 N. E. 355.
56Brandreth v. Lance, (1839) 8 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 24, 24 Am. Dec. 368;
Life Ass'n v. Boogher, (1876) 3 Mo. App. 173.
57 By statute libels may now be enjoined in England. Odgers, Libel
and Slander, 5th ed., 426, 428.58 Howell v. Bee Pub. Co., (1916) 100 Neb. 39, 158 N. W. 358, L. R. A.
1917A 160.
59 "The sovereign power has forbidden any instrumentality of the gov-
ernment it has instituted to limit or restrain the right, except by fear of
the penalty, civil or criminal, which may wait on abuse. The general
assembly can pass no law abridging the freedom of speech or the press.
It can only punish the licentious abuse of that freedom." Marx, etc.,
Clothing Co. v. Watson, (1902) 168 Mo. 133, 67 S. W. 391, 90 Am. St. Rep.
440, 56, L. R. A. 951.
60 Empire Theater Co. v. Cloke, (1917) '53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. 107,
L. R. A. 1917E 383.
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case6' that freedom of publication was not involved since the pub-
lication of the unlawful communications and orders was but an
incident of the unlawful conspiracy that was enjoined. In Texas
it has been held, seemingly without serious effort on the part of
the court, that the defendant in a suit for alienation of a wife's
affections may be enjoined from speaking or writing to the way-
ward wife, in spite of the constitutional guaranty of free speech. 62
It is respectfully suggested that these injunction cases well
illustrate the unfortunate consequences of the construction that
liberty of the press means absolute absence of previous restraint
of any kind upon publications of any kind. It would seem more
reasonable, and far more practicable, to say that the constitutional
provision in question prohibits any other previous restraints than
those recognized and accepted at the time the constitution was
adopted, thus leaving the courts free to exercise their equity
powers in accordance with settled principles of justice.
The theory of construction which seems to the writer to rest.
upon sound principle is that the constitutional guaranty in ques-
tion was intended not only to abolish forever previous censor-
ship of publications by the government, but also to safeguard the
citizen from auy larger liability for his uncensored publication, or
for his public utterance, than was imposed by the rules of the com-
mon law as accepted at the time-of the making of the federal con-
stitution. It would necessarily follow from the acceptance of this
theory that a statute imposing new and distinct restrictions, not
recognized by the common law as known by the makers of the
constitution, would be void. This theory finds not a little judi-
cial support, though it is not so articulate as one could wish.
Justice Harlan, in the case of Patterson v. Colorado,6 3 dissenting
with his usual vigor, said:
"It [the majority opinion] yet proceeds to say that the main
purpose of such constitutional provisions was to prevent all such
'previous restraints' upon publications as had been practised by
other governments, but not to prevent the subsequent punishment
of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare. I can-
not assent to that view, if it be meant that the legislature may
impair or abridge the rights of a free press and of free speech
whenever it thinks that the public requires that to be done. The
61Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., (1911) 221 U.S. 418, 31
S. C. R. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874.
62 Ex parte Warfield, (1899) 40 Tex. Cr. 413, 50 S. W. 933, 76 Am. St.
Rep. 724.
63 (1907) 205 U.S. 454 (464), 51 L. Ed. 879, 27 S.C. R. 556, 10 Ann.
Cas. 689.
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public welfare cannot override constitutional privileges, and if
the rights of free speech and of a free press are, in their essence,
attributes of national citizenship, as I think they are, then neither
Congress nor any state, since the adoption of the 14th amend-
ment, can, by legislative enactments or by judicial action, impair
or abridge them."
So, in the often cited case of Cowan v. Fairbrother,64 the
court said:
"In its broadest sense, 'freedom of the press' includes not only
exemption from censorship, but security against laws enacted by
the legislative department of the government, or measures re-
sorted to by either of the other branches for the purpose of stifling
just criticism or muzzling public opinion."
Cases holding unconstitutional the so-called "black-listing"
statutes, which require an employer discharging an employee to
give him a written statement showing the true reason for his dis-
charge, decide in effect that a statute imposing upon the exercise
of freedom of speech a penalty unrecognized by common law
standards violates the constitutional provision, though it has no
relation to any previous restraints on communication.65 The
same thing may be said of those cases which hold void statutes
forbidding and penalizing the nomination, endorsement or recom-
nmendation of a candidate for office by a convention or political
party, making illegal the publication of any report as to fitness
,or qualifications of candidates for public office unless accompanied
by certain information as to sources.66 These penalties imposed
for publication of statements wholly lawful in accordance with
common law standards, abridge the liberty of the press.
We are now ready, in conclusion, to apply the principles
-worked out to the question, so important in times of national
excitement, like the present, as to how far the government can
go in suppressing utterances deemed to be injurious to the public
safety and welfare, disregarding, for the purpose of this dis-
cussion, Professor Fletcher's forceful contention 67 that all con-
stitutional guaranties must yield in time of war to the paramount
-war power given to Congress and to the President by the consti-
64 (1896) 118 N. C. 406. 24 S. E. 212, 54 Am. St. Rep. 733. 32 L. R. A. 829.
65 St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Griffin, (1916) 106 Tex. 477, 121 S. W. 703,
L. R. A. 1917B 1108; Wallace v. Georgia, etc., Ry. Co., (1894) 94 Ga. 732.
22 S. E. 579. Such statutes have been held valid as a proper exercise of
police power. See Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co., (Mo. 1917) 192 S. W. 387.
66 Ex parte Harrison, (1908) 212 Mo. 88, 110 S.W. 709, 126 Am. St.
Rep. 557, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 950, 15 Ann. Cas. 1.
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tution, as to which we may safely say that the courts will not
have recourse to it except as a last resort.
According to the theory that the guaranty of free speech and
free press was intended only to banish all previous restraint, it is
clear that Congress or the state legislature can declare any sort
of utterance which it deems hurtful to the public welfare to be
seditious and punishable so long as it imposes no censorship. It
could thus penalize not only such statements as were recognized as
seditious at common law, but could also make it a crime to speak
or write of the president, the Congress or the courts in such terms
of criticism as might not be libelous under common law rules,
and yet tend to bring the government and-its officers and agencies
into popular disesteem. A citizen would be perfectly free to pub-
lish what he chose and then take such punishment as might be
meted out to him, just as he did in the time of George I. It was
on this theory that the infamous sedition laws of 1798 were
passed, to be used by the then dominant Federalist party largely
for the purpose of oppressing and destroying their political oppo-
nents. The constitutionality of this law, vigorously denied by
the anti-F ederalist party, never came to be passed on by the Su-
preme Court, then in its trembling infancy, but its unpopularity
was so great that the party responsible for it was destroyed. The
celebrated Kentucky Resolutions declared the law void ag con-
trary to the constitution, and Jefferson, upon coming to the Presi-
dency in 1801, ordered all prosecutions under it dismissed on the
express ground that it was unconstitutional.
According to the second theory of construction, Congress
cannot, without unlawfully abridging the freedom of the press,
pass any law making utterances punishable as seditious unless
such utterances would be regarded as seditious and criminal un-
der the rules of the common law as recognized and accepted in
1787. We may state the rule more concisely thus: whatever ut-
terance was punishable at common law in the colonies as a sedi-
tious libel immediately before the constitution was adopted could
be made punishable by act of Congress immediately after its
adoption in spite of the first amendment, but further Congress
was prohibited from going. It will be kept in mind that there can
be no common law libel against the government of the United
States, since crimes cognizable by the federal courts are purely
statutory.68
6sCooley. Constitutional Law 304; United States v. Hudson, (1812)
7 Cranch (U. S.) 32, 3 L. Ed. 259.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
There can be no doubt that in early times any censuring com-
ment. upon the Sovereign, either house of Parliament, or upon the
constitution and laws of England, was indictable. Thus in 1629 a
merchant was tried before the Star Chamber for saying that a
merchant was more "screwed and wrung" in England than in Tur-
key, found guilty of sedition, since his utterance tended to cast
dishonor upon the King's Government, and severely punished.6 9
In other cases of the same time even more trivial statements were
made the occasion of inflicting savage penalties, but these tyran-
nous prosecutions provoked such fierce resentment that prosecu-
tion for libel against the government never Yesum'ed its violent
form after the English Revolution. By the time of the American
Revolution this terrible agency of oppression had been so modi-
fied as to assume a character thus described by a leading author-
ity on English constitutional law :70
"The essence of seditious libel may be said to be its imme-
diate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal
courses, that is to say, to induce people to resort to illegal methods
other than those provided by the Constitution, in order to re-
dress the evils which press upon their minds. If laws are un-
just, the legal method is to petition Parliament to amend them.
If a minister is obnoxious, the legal method is to petition the
Crown to remove him, and failing that to dismiss at the next
opportunity those members of Parliament who support him.
Whenever a writing is so framed as to urge strongly the people,
and especially the ignorant and turbulent portion of the people,
to take some shorter and illegal method, not at a future time, but
at once, of attaining the end in view, then it may be said to be a
seditious libel."
The same author also defined seditious libel as "any words
which tend to incite people immediately to take other than legal
courses to alter what the Government has in charge."
As Cooley says,71 it is doubtful whether the common law rule
as to seditious libel ever became a part of the common law of the
American states, so unsuited is it to American political conditions.
Certainly there could be no common law seditious libel upon the
Government of the United States, and the founders of that gov-
ernment evidently had no intention that it should ever be set up by
statute in its one-time repressive form. But it is inconceivable
that they intended to deprive the government of powers to pre-
69 Rex v. Chambers, (1629) 3 St. Tr. 373.
70 Paterson, Liberty of Press and Speech 82.
71 Constitutional Limitations 526.
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serve itself by making seditious utterances criminal offenses. The
reasonable inference is that they intended strictly to limit the
new government's statutory powers to penalize utterances as
seditious, to those which were seditious under the then accepted
common law rule, and that any statutory extension of the defini-
tion of the crime was forbidden as an abridgment of the right
of free discussion of public affairs, everywhere recognized as ab-
solutely essential to the maintenance of a free government.
Therefore we conclude that Congress has power to punish as sedi-
tious all utterances, whether spoken or written which advise or
tend to cause disobedience to the law, or resistance to its officers,
or which tend to subvert the government by inducing or encourag-
ing attempts to change or hinder governmental actions or policies
by any other methods than those sanctioned by law, or tend to in-
cite riot and disorder or to cause disturbances of the public peace.
On the other hand, Congress has no power to abridge the right
freely to discuss all public measures, to expose their defects and
urge their alteration or repeal by legal methods, to criticise the
constitution and the laws and advocate their amendment, and to
comment, however severely if only it be fairly, upon the eon-
duct of the officers of the government, Such adverse comment, so
long as it does not tend to excite resistance to the law or breach of
the peace, though it may be intemperate and unreasonable, and
possibly vexatious and even harmful, is not seditious.7 2 Fortun-
ately the vagueness of every statement of what constitutes sedi-
tion does not cause so much trouble in the trial of the cause as
in the wording of the statute, since if the statute be valid and the
72 Ray, J., in the recent case of United States v. Pierce, (1917) 245
Fed. 878 (888), gives this excellent summary statement of what constitutes
sedition :
"Citizens have the right to critltize .the existing laws, point out their
defects, injustice, and unwisdom. and advocate their amendment or repeal;
but they have no constitutional right to counsel, advise, encourage, and
solicit resistance to the execution of or refusal to obey them. A political
party and its individual members may advocate the repeal of existing laws,
their amendment and improvement, and point out defects, and a political
party may be formed for this very purpose. However, a so-called political
party may not be formed to resist the exectition of existing laws claimed
to be unwise, unpatriotic, and oppressive, and its members permitted to
encourage and advocate resistance to their due execution because of their
membership therein. -The willful resistance to the execution of a valid law
may be made a crime, as may the willful obstruction of its enforcement
Any and all. resistance and any and all obstruction to the operation or
enforcement of a law may be declared an offense. It is the duty of all
persons to obey the law and in lawful ways when called upon by due
authority to aid in its enforcement. If this is not true, no government
can survive."
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indictment sufficient, the issue as to whether the utterances com-
plained of are seditious or not will be determined by the jury ac-
cording as they think the defendant blamable or not. Thus a
sedition law, supported by public sentiment, will be enforceable,
while one violating the public sense of justice and freedom will
register its unfitness in verdicts of acquittal.
W. R. VANCE.
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